Notes by Editors,
May, 1933
NOTES
SURRENDER BY OPERATION OF LAw-The law of surrender by operation of
law, as applied by the courts of a given jurisdiction, is more or less definite and
well settled.' However, it would seem profitable, in view of the confusion in
the theory on which it is based, to examine the motivating causes underlying it,
ind to consider the manner in which it functions. Discussions of surrender
almost invariably begin with the following quotation from Lord Coke: "'Sur-
render,' sursum redditio, properly is a yeelding up of an estate in reversion or
remainder, wherein the estate for life or yeares may drowne by mutuall agree-
ment betweene them." 2 The legal consequence of the "drowning" is the sever-
ance of the relation of landlord and tenant which was established by the creation
of the leasehold estate. For the surrender to be complete and a true surrender,
as distinguished from the so-called surrender of the premises or physical estate,
the contractual, as well as tenurial, relations growing out of the leasehold must
be severed.4 Unless both these aspects of the landlord-tenant relation are ter-
minated, there can be no "surrender" in the sense that that term is used in this
note.
The Statute of Frauds,5 which has been adopted or legislated into American
law in practically all jurisdictions, provides that all surrenders must be in writing
or by "act and operation of law".( Its effect is to establish in addition to sur-
renders in writing another class, which, to be surrenders at all, must be surrenders
"by act and operation of law". It is important to note, however, that under
modern statutes a parol surrender is permissible in a limited number of cases,
7
and that the equitable doctrine of partial performance will lift other cases out of
the Statute of Frauds.' With these two qualifications, a surrender by operation
of law will include any surrender which is not in writing.
Surrenders other than express surrenders were known to the law before
the Statute. Several examples are to be found in the early reports. The factual
situations are all of one class, to wit, thet lessee purports to take and hold prem-
ises under a new interest granted him during the term of his existing leasehold
in those premises, which new interest is so inconsistent with the original one
that both could not have existed simultaneously.9 It was certainly desirable in
many cases to give this second interest effect, the parties having often materially
changed their positions on the basis of it. By application of the strict logic of
the common law, it was impossible to give it such effect unless there had been
'Schnebly, Operative Facts in Surrenders (927) 22 ILL. L. REV. 22 and 117, contains a
very complete summary of the substantive law in this field.
Co. LITT. *337b. It will be seen that a surrender involves the conveyance of the tenant's
interest to his landlord.
' This term is applied to a transfer of possession of the premises by the tenant to the
landlord which does not extinguish the contractual obligations of the leasehold. Qutere as
to whether even the tenurial relations are extinguished in the situations to which this term
is applied.
'That there are two aspects or "privities" in a lease which contains covenants was no-
ticed early in the law. See Walker's Case, 2 Co. 22a (1587). The entire law of covenants
running with the land is based upon this bi-privity of the landlord and tenant relation.
529 CAR. II, c. 3 (1677).
' Section 3.
Schnebly, supra note I, at 29 et seq.8
Zd. at 37 et seq.
9 Although surrenders by operation of law affected both life estates and estates for years
and were effected by any inconsistent interest being given the tenant, the overwhelming pre-




a surrender of the first interest, and, in the absence of the Statute, there was no
policy to restrain the upholding or implying of a grant other than one in writing.
The surrender was necessary. Since the lessor had already vested one
estate in the lessee, he could not vest another infringing upon it unless it had
revested in himself, which would normally occur only at the expiration of the
term, by definition still running. Similarly, since two estates of present enjoy-
ment could not vest in the same person at the same time, the lessee, already
having one such estate, could not acquire another. There is also the possibility,
although doubted by one writer,10 that as a livery of possession was necessary
to validate a leasehold estate, and as the tenant was in possession, the landlord's
inability to make such livery precluded him from making a valid lease. The
courts, however, soon discovered a means of dealing with these situations. The
first case to be found in the Year Books holds that an express surrender is
unnecessary in the above situation, and that a mere entry on the part of the
lessor, if permitted by the lessee, will suffice to validate the second grant made
during that entry.' 1 If, as the courts say in their opinions, a surrender is held
to be necessary for such validation, this entry must have been equivalent to a
surrender in law, or by operation thereof. In later years, the entry was dis-
pensed with and the mere giving of a second lease was held either to "imply": 2
a surrender or be a surrender "by course of the common law". 13
It can readily be seen that this surrender, implied or by course of law, was
fictional. The tenant did not expressly use words of surrender and the parties
certainly did not subjectively intend a surrender. Probably most tenants desired
merely an alteration in the terms of their holding, rather than a complete ter-
mination thereof. If the court merely looked at their acts and implied a sur-
render, or said that "the parties must have intended a surrender", then they
established a fictional surrender to accomplish what they considered a desirable
result. Quite naturally they supplied the fiction with a very nice theory which
would make the result seem to flow from syllogistic legal reasoning. By taking
the second lease the tenant was said to have admitted that the landlord had the
right to give it, and hence that he had made a surrender, for otherwise the
landlord could not have had the right to give it.' 4 'But if it is realized that the
question before the court is, was there a surrender and did the lessor have the
power to give the new lease, and could the lessee hold under it, this theory is
disclosed as a petitio principii.
With typical common law strictness these new fictions were applied even
to the point of injustice. Early cases held that the taking of a second lease, even
" Updegraff, The Elevwnt of Intent in Surrender by Operation of Law (1924) 38 HARV.
L. REv. 64, 78, citing 2 POLLOCK AND MAIrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1895) 92, feels
that the element of possession is immaterial in surrenders. It may be argued, however, that
though a transfer of possession from the tenant to the landlord on the occasion of a surrender
has no significance, a transfer of possession from the landlord to the tenant, i. e., entry under
the lease, perfecting, as it did, the interesse termini into an estate, had great significance. It
is conceivable that at some time in the past inability to permit such entry (the exclusive right
of possession already having been granted) prevented the giving of a valid lease. Hence the
significance of the lessor's entry in Chamberlaine et ux. v. Prioress of Clerkenwell, infra
note II.
' Chamberlaine et ux. v. Prioress of Clerkenwell, P. 4o Ed. III, f. 23b, pl. 24 (1366).
Ice v. Sams, Cro. Eliz. 521 (1596). This terminology was used by Lord Mansfield as
late as 1768 and, since the Statute of Frauds was then in force, it must follow that he con-
sidered these implied surrenders as working by operation of law. Davison ex dem. Bromley
v. Stanley, 4 Burr. 2210 (Eng. 1768). See also Schiefflein v. Carpenter, 15 Wend. 400, 4o6
(N. Y. 1836).
'Fulmerston v. Steward, i Plowd. IO2, io7a (1553).
" See VIN. ABR., "Surrender" F. 9 (1546) ; Ive v. Sams, supra note 12. This is a form
of estoppel and it was so called by Baron Parke in Lyon v. Reed et al., 13 M. & W. 284 (Eng.1844).
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if void, would operate as a surrender of the first, 5 and though the second lease
was to begin at a future date, the surrender was still immediate and the lessor
could enter and take the profits in the interim.' One case held that if there
was any right conditional on the termination of the first lease, such right would
take precedence over the second lease, since it vested immediately on the ter-
mination of the first.' But in time the courts realized the error of their ways
and, by an application, perhaps subconscious, of the maxim fictia legis neminem
laedit, modified the harshness of these rules.'"
Surrenders by operation of law would probably never have troubled the
modern lawyer but for the passage of the Statute of Frauds. This enactment
lifted what had formerly been merely a tool of limited use to the status of an
important weapon. It left in surrenders "by act and operation of law" the
only shock absorber to eliminate the jars of this legislation on the growing
morality and complexity of the law. Unless there was a writing, the courts
could procure certain legal consequences which depended on surrenders only by
classifying a situation as a surrender by operation of law.
The old forms of surrender continued in use under the statute. 9 It is
indeed probable that the legislators never intended to pave the way for other
and new forms. But, as the minds of the judges opened more and more to
principles of abstract justice and became less and less bound by strict formalism,
it was desirable to avoid injustices in the law of leases brought on by the strict
rules of tenure and the equally strict regulations of the statute. Creation or
recognition of new forms of surrender by operation of law furnished a handy
implement. It was early said that if the lessor relet the premises on his own
account with the tenant's consent, or if there was an agreed substitution of
tenants, a surrender resulted.2  The term surrender by operation of law need
not have been applied here, as in most factual situations the principles of
estoppel in pais would have sufficed to do justice for the parties.2' But the
courts chose to call it surrender.
Probably the most frequently litigated situation which was dealt with in
terms of surrender by operation of law was an abandonment of the premises
by the tenant followed by a repossession by the landlord. It would be clearly
unjust to hold a tenant who had abandoned his premises to the payment of the
entire rent to a landlord who had reoccupied them. The old law pictured the
rent as flowing from the land and, if possession was in the landlord, it would
not be necessary in order to insure to him the benefits of the "flow" that another
make payments. If the rent arose from a covenant, the real consideration for
the payment was the beneficial occupancy of the premises, and though a mere
refusal to avail oneself of the benefits thereof should not excuse the obligation,
yet, if the landlord by his own act appropriated to himself the use for which the
tenant was paying, it was only fair that some adjustment be made. The courts
M ellows v. May, Cro. Eliz. 874 (16oi).
' Hutchins v. Martin, Cro. Eliz. 6o5 (1598).17Wrotesley v. Adams, I Plowd. 186 (1558).
' Watt v. Maydewell, Hutt. lO4 (1625), shows that at that date the law had not yet been
settled on the effect of void leases. But thirteen years later in Lloyde v. Gregory, W. Jones
406 (1638), Crooke, Jones, and Barkeley had no difficulty in deciding that the acceptance of
a void lease caused no surrender, nor did Lord Mansfield in Davison v. Stanley, supra note
12.
19See VIN. AER. "Surrender" for numbers of such cases The modem law is discussed
in Schnebly, supra note i, at 117 et seq.
' Hil. 21 Hen. VII, f. 7 pl. 6 (15o6). See also Williamson v. Crossett, 62 Ark. 393, 36
S. W. 27 (1896). So also would an acceptance of the assignee of a lessee as the principal
tenant operate as a surrender of the lessee-assignor's term. Reeve v. Bird, i C. M. & R. 31
01834).
S ee Vandekar v. Reeves, 4o Hun 43o (N. Y. I886), which is criticised on the facts in
Ettlinger v. Kruger, 76 Misc. 540, 135 N. Y. Supp. 659 (1912), 146 App. Div. 824, 131 N. Y.
Supp. 436 (1911).
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did this by holding that if the landlord repossessed himself of the premises a
surrender by operation of law resulted.2
The theory of this holding is obscure. Most courts spoke of eviction,23
but this cannot be the basis of the surrender. Eviction implies an ousting from
beneficial enjoyment,24 whereas here the tenant had already abandoned when
the landlord entered. 25 If it were an eviction there would be no necessity to
hold it a surrender to do justice. Either one would suspend rent, and since the
cases all deal with rent there is no way of determining why the courts chose
surrender rather than eviction (which they said existed) upon which to base
their decisions. It is only from a later decision, which held that the original
tenant could not maintain ejectment against a subsequent lessee of the repossessed
landlord,2 that the intention of the court may be identified. On this meager
thread is hung the conclusion that surrender was consciously used by the courts
to effect results greater than a mere suspension of rent.
It might be asked, what would be considered as a retaking of possession
by the landlord? This was settled without much difficulty. The landlord was
given the right to enter to prevent waste and to, make needed repairs, 27 and he
also soon acquired the privilege of hanging out a "to let" sign without causing
a surrender.2" But if he should take the beneficial use to himself,2 or make
extensive repairs, 0 or certainly if he should relet the premises to another ten-
ant,21 a surrender by operation of law would occur. It can easily be seen that
this last condition worked an economic hardship on the landlord. If his tenant
abandoned 32 the premises the landlord either had to permit the premises to
remain vacant and risk collecting the rent from a person who had probably dis-
appeared, or else relet them entirely at his own risk, for if he should relet them
for but one day of the remaining term, he was without remedy for the loss
occasioned by any idleness of the premises during the remainder of the term.
3
The landlord was in a rather precarious position, with a difficult choice to
make.34 If he could manage to obtain his tenant's consent to relet on the tenant's
I Walls v. Atcheson, 3 Bing. 462 (Eng. 1826); Hansen v. Russell, 75 Mo. App. 1io
(1898); Boyd v. George, 2 Neb. Unoff. 42o, 89 N. W. 271 (19o2); Marsailles v. Kerr, 6
Whart. 500 (Pa. 1840) ; Rice v. Dudley, 65 Ala. 68 (i88o).
Day v. Watson, 8 Mich. 535 (186o) ; Rice v. Dudley, sapra note 22; Locascio v. Barber,
17 Ala. App. 595, 87 So. 703 (192o), certiorari denied 2o5 Ala. 86, 87 So. 704 (192o) ; and
see Walls v. Atcheson, supra note 22.
'Albrecht v. Thieme, 97 N. J. L. lO3, 1O5, 116 Atl. 276, 277 (I92) ; 2 TIFFANY, LAND-
LORD AND TENANT (1910) 1258. See Macaluso v. Easley, 8r Colo. 50, 55, 253 Pac. 397, 399
(1927).
See Stewart v. Sprague, 71 Mich. 5o, 55, 38 N. W. 673, 677 (1888).
Mullaney v. McReynolds, 170 Mo. App. 4o6, 155 S. W. 476 (1913).
'r Chandler v. Hinds, 135 Wis. 43, 115 N. W. 339 (19o8) ; Duffy v. Day, 42 Mo. App. 638
(i8o) ; Livermore and Cooley v. Eddy's Adm'r, 33 Mo. 547 (1863).
Oastler v. Henderson, 2 Q. B. Div. 575 (1877) ; Walls v. Atcheson, supra note 22;
Scott v. Beecher et al., 91 Mich. 590, 52 N. W. 20 (1892).
'Dodd and Davies v. Ackloam, 6 M. & G. 672 (Eng. 1843); Talbot v. Whipple, 96 Mass.
177, ISo (1867) ; David Present Co. v. Tamasauskas, 21o App. Div. 786, 206 N. Y. Supp. 594
(194).
Cf. Duffy v. Day, supra note 27; Breuckmann v. Twibill, 89 Pa. 58 (1879).
Schuisler & Donnell v. Ames, i6 Ala. 73 (1849) ; Rice v. Dudley, supra note 22. See
also Marseilles v. Kerr, supra note 22.
' Abandonment requires a vacation of the premises with an intent not to return. See
Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. 359, 362, 44 Atl. 446, 447 (1899).
= Pelton v. Place and Skeels, 71 Vt. 430, 46 Atl. 63 (1899) (lessor rented premises for
Suly he legal effects of his selection of a course of action are discussed in McCormick,
The Rights of the Landlord upo Abandonment of the Premises by the Tenant (1925) 23
MICH. L. REV. 211. The draftsmen of modern leases have protected the lessor by the inclu-
sion of various clauses giving him the right of re-entry and reletting at his option in certain
situations, without affecting the tenant's liability for rent. See Lwis, LAw OF LEASEs OF
REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 193o) especially clauses 14 and 22.
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account, the tenant agreeing to remain liable for the balance of the rent, then he
was protected, in that here there was either an estoppel to deny liability therefor
or he was bound by an express contract.35 The first tenant, in that case, was
not bound to pay any more rent, but he was bound to pay damages for the detri-
ment incurred by the landlord in reletting and thereby causing a surrender.
There was one insurmountable difficulty, however, the difficulty in obtaining the
assent of the tenant. Thus, in fact, the lessor was still without adequate pro-
tection.
The courts, realizing this fact, next advanced the rule of Auer v. Penn ,
which permitted the lessor to relet the premises abandoned by his tenant to
another and still hold the original tenant liable for any difference between the
rent on the second lease and that which was due on the balance of the first
term, provided the landlord evidenced his intention of not discharging the
original tenant of his liability by the reletting. This rule was quickly followed
and is now almost universally acceptedS 7  A strictly logical explanation of this
rule according to the precepts of the early common law, is easily seen to be
impossible. Such explanation must succeed, inter alia, in transferring the estate
from the first tenant to the second through the agency of the landlord, and still
keep the first tenant under liability to the landlord for any deficiency in rent.
To say the landlord is the tenant's agent for the transfer is obviously false, since
his assent is not even required to validate the transaction, nor is it absolutely
necessary in most jurisdictions for him even to be notified. Nor has the lessor
an authority in writing, which is required by the strict rules of agency if the
principal is to be bound on this type of contract. 8 An attempt to justify the
result by separating the tenurial from the contractual aspects of the lease and
saying that the tenurial "estate" is surrendered, but that liability on the contract
remains, is also somewhat strained, when it is remembered that in fact the con-
sideration for the covenants in the lease is the tenurial estate and that when that
estate is surrendered, the consideration fails and continued performance should
not be required. Irrespective of any rationalization, it is clear that the second
tenant suffers no risk of being ejected by the first tenant, and at least by so
much, has an estate.ll
A careful examination of the judicial precedents on which this doctrine is
based is informative. A perusal of a list of cases cited in a standard reference
work as authority for the proposition of Auer v. Penn 4 0 shows that the ultimate
authorities on which the opinions of the judges were based either do not hold
as the citing courts have stated, or else contain merely unsupported dicta on
the point. A few courts have used language tending to show a recognition that
the opinion was in fact judicial legislation. 41
I Ogden v. Rowe, 3 E. D. Smith 312 (N. Y. C. P. 1854) ; Leavitt v. Maykel, 210 Mass.
55, 96 N. E. 51 (1911).
99 Pa. 370 (1882). This is the leading case on this point although not the earliest. See
Meyer v. Smith, 33 Ark. 627 (1878).
UT 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1338 and footnotes 143 and 144 for a list of cases.
Some jurisdictions were more liberal and did not require notice. Others refused to follow
and demanded the assent of the tenant. Gray v. Kaufman Dairy and Ice Cream Co., 162 N.
Y. 388, 56 N. E. 9o3 (19oo ) ; Rice v. Dudley, supra note 22.
"I Authority to execute instruments under seal (in which category leases fall) must be
conferred by instruments under seal. Gordon v. Bulkley, 14 S. & R. 331 (Pa. 1826) ; Maus
v. Worthing, 4 Ill. 26 (1841) ; I MECHEM, TEm LAW OF AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 212. How-
ever, should the lease contain provisions, for reletting this would be sufficient power to the
landlord. See LEwis, loc. cit. supra note 34.
"Mullaney v. McReynolds, supra note 26.
"0Note (19o8) 13 L. R. A. (N. s.) 398. The cases examined were those cited on pages
398-400.
"Meyer v. Smith, supra note 36; Winant v. Hines, 14 Daly 187 (N. Y. 1887).
NOTES
The rule of Auer v. Penn introduces to this field of the law the principle
of mitigation of damages.4 2 It grants to the landlord of an abandoning tenant
the privilege of mitigating damages by reletting the premises. It is true that if
the estate of the second tenant is to be kept secure as against the first, that this
gives a right to one person to divest the property interest of another without the
divestee's consent, but this is not a strange occurrence in the law. It exists in
the case of the statutory lien of the vendor, where a sale which divests the
vendee of a vested title is permitted; 4 3 it exists in the fields of infant's contracts
where a vested contractual right may be divested by the infant's disaffirmance; 44
and it is known in other fields as well.45 The decisions make no attempt to
explain the transfer of the right. The power to divest is given as such, and
there is no particular reason why in this branch of property law a similar right
should not be granted as an adjunct to the privilege of mitigating damages.
Justice and sound economic practice indicate the desirability of such action.
The conflict between the rule of Auer v. Penn and that of other cases in-
volving surrender by operation of law is real and cannot in all probability be
resolved by use of the language of the opinions, including such fictions as are
already recognized, without the superimposition of more fiction. It seems to
be interstitial legislation invoked by the courts to prevent obvious injustice. The
providentially undefined term of "surrender by act and operation of law" offered
the opportunity, and the courts were quick to seize it as a means of satisfying
their conservatism and yet accomplishing the desired end. But there still re-
mained the task of deciding the exact situations to which this device would be
applied.
An examination of a number of modem cases will disclose that intent is
an all-important consideration in the decisions. 46  This is not necessarily a
novelty, since if among the operative facts required for a surrender by operation
of law there is abandonment, there is the intent of one party to consider. And now
with the landlord given the option of reletting in mitigation of damages or reoc-
cupying on his own account, which of the alternatives he has elected to pursue
must be determined by an examination of his intent. Many decisions say that only
if there is evidence of a positive intent to "accept the surrender" will the surrender
result.47 The older forms of surrender based on inconsistent grants still are in
existence.48 If the rule of the Statute of Frauds is restated in terms of the above
situations, it will be found that surrenders may be expressed in writing, may be
effected by certain sets of facts which require the consequences of a surrender
to do justice for the parties, and may result from a mutual intent on the part
I This was first recognizet in the texts on damages in 3 SEDGwICK, DAMAGES (9th ed.
1912) § M99f. It does not appear in the eighth edition. Some jurisdictions have carried this
principle to the point of intimating that such mitigation of damages is mandatory on the
landlord. See Roberts v. Watson, 196 Iowa 816, 195 N. W. 211 (1923); Benson et al. v.
Iowa Bake-Rite Co., 207 Iowa 410, 221 N. W. 464 (1928); Campbell v. McLaurin Invest-
ment Co., 74 Fla. 501, 77 So. 277 (1917).
'UNIFORm SALS Acr § 6o, i U. L. A. (1931) 310; 3 WnIIST0N, CoN AcTs (1922)
§ 1372.
"I W11,srON, CONTRACTS (1922) § 231.
Typical instances are the negotiation by a thief of a stolen negotiable instrument, N. I.
L. §§ 16 and 57; BRANNAN, NEaovlAmmi INSTRUMENT LAW (Beutel'i ed. 1932) 238; a pur-
chase in good faith in a market overt, i WILliSToN, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 347.
,0 This is discussed by Updegraff, supra note IO.
'Williamson v. Crosset, supra note 20; Underhill v. Collins, 132 N. Y. 269, 3o N. E. 576
(1892) ; Flannagan v. Dickerson, 103 Okl. 206, 207, 229 Pac. 552, 553 (924) ; Weinsklar
Realty Co. v. Dooley et al., 200 Wis. 412, 228 N. W. 515 (1930) ; (1930) 14 MA QRu=n L.
REv. 182. This intent has been held to be a ,fact to be found by the jury. Grigsby v. Ruland,
21o App. Div. 640, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 376 (924).
' Enyeart v. Davis, 17 Neb. 228, 22 N. W. 449 (1885).
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of the landlord and tenant to effect a surrender (fortified by certain acts that
manifest the intent, such as an abandonment and repossession by the landlord).
This definition coupled with the proposition that every intent to abandon is or
includes an intent to surrender,49 will result in surrender by operation of law
being dependent in a sense on the same type of mutual intent as is necessary to
a contract.
What are the certain acts which must manifest the intention to accept a
surrender in order for the courts to wave the wand of surrender by operation
of law, and why are the acts necessary? Reletting by the landlord satisfies the
requirement provided no intent to the contrary be shown.50  Recent cases pur-
port to be satisfied with any unequivocal act of possession on the part of the
landlord following the tenant's abandonment. The entire concept, however, is
too new to have a large body of case law built around it. But are the courts
not merely attempting to escape the antiquated strictness of the Statute of
Frauds and yet preserve its valuable tendency to prevent perjury by requiring
something more than mere words to show the intention of the parties? 51 In
fact it has reduced surrender to almost purely contractual principles, protecting
against fraud by requiring evidence of high evidentiary character from which
to find the intent of the parties.
The history and trend of the law of surrender as developed above is based
largely on speculation and conjecture by the writer. But the appearance of new
cases and departures has so naturally followed the broadening of the ideals of
justice in the law courts that their connection must inevitably be inferred. It is
also true that only one form of surrender is here analyzed, but it is by far the
most important form and conclusions derived from its study may well be applied
to any other phases of the topic which may be discovered.
The confusion in this field has resulted from a failure to realize that sur-
render by operation of law is nothing more than a classification. It includes all
situations which the courts believe require legal consequences of a surrender to
permit them to do justice. Its breadth is dependent on the courts' sense of
justice. Failure of the courts to alter their rules by judicial legislation has left
in various jurisdictions a body of law which, though perhaps logically sound,
is replete with unjust results. It has resulted in draftsmen incorporating into
leases such provisions as will remove the doubt from the remedies of the land-
lord and afford him his desired security without subjecting his safety to the perils
of lawyers and courts befogged by the veils of a fiction.52  They have included
covenants which in effect remove from the field the decadent, if not already
obsolete, concept of tenure, a creature of the law of bygone times whose sole
function, at least insofar as the law of surrender is concerned, is making doc--
trines, which are obviously just, illogical.5 3 The remedy, if any be necessary, lies
"It is practically axiomatic that a tenant abandoning his premises and failing to pay
rent does in fact intend that the abandonment shall have the effecV of terminating all his lia-
bilities to the landlord, and he is very much surprised and chagrined when this does not
happen.
r' That is the effect of the notice required by some states following the rule of Auer v.
Penn, supra note 36. See Steel v. Thompson, 59 Cal. App. i9I, 2Io Pac. 43o (1922).
51 Recent writers are unanimous in their opinion that the Statute of Frauds was not
aimed solely at the prevention of perjury by witnesses, but as much at the prevention of the
tendency of juries to ignore the doubtfulness of the perjured testimony. With judicial con-
trol of the jury's findings established, has not the need for such rigorous control over evi-
dence disappeared? See Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism (1928) 3
IND. L. J. 427, 428; Kerr, Let Us Consider the Statute of Frauds (1927) WASH. S. B. A.
71, 74 et seq.
' Lawis, loc. cit. supra note 34-
' The only possible place in this field of law where tenure might be a useful concept is
in the determination of to whom any money received over the original rental obligation col-
lected from a reletting under the authority of Auer v. Penn should go. However, Whit-
comb v. Brant, go N. J. L. 245, IOO AtI. 175 (197), ably decides this question on purely con-
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in the realization that the justification of the various aspects of surrender by
operation of law lies in their application, and that, of necessity, any theory
which is advanced to reconcile it to the body of common law is merely the
attempt on the part of those in whom the responsibility for the form of the law
lies to satisfy their emotional or intellectual conservatism."4 It is only when
such realization comes that the body of law surrounding this device will unfold
itself as free from the inconsistencies which a formalistic approach and analysis
reveal.
L.I.M.
VENUE OF CRIMINAL LIBEL-Criminal libel is generally defined as "the
malicious publication of any writing, sign, picture, effigy, or other representa-
tion tending to expose any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule".1 While
there is not complete agreement in this definition,2 there is unanimity in holding
that publication is essential to the offense. As Newell puts it, "the law per-
mits us to think as badly as we please of our neighbors so long as we keep our
uncharitable thoughts to ourselves"."
There are two views as to what is necessary to constitute publication, and
these are reflected in the decisions as to the venue of the crime. The first is that
there must be actual communication of the defamatory words to others ;4 and
that every sale or delivery of a written or printed copy of a libel is a fresh pub-
lication.5 The other view is that there is a publication as soon as the defama-
tory words are started on their way, so that in the ordinary course of events
they will be seen by others.6
tract principles and properly permits the landlord to keep the excess. Distinguish Rosenblum
v. Uber, 256 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 3d, i919) (additional factors of agreement to let for the in-
solvent's estate's benefit and question of priorities).
"' The reasons for appearance of legal fictions are discussed in Fuller, Legal Fictios
(1931) 25 ILL. L. REv. 513.
I CLARx, CRIMES (Mikell's ed. 1915) § i56. See Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163,
167 (18o8). Libel is now defined by the criminal statutes of most states.
02 BIsHOP, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923) §§ 907 ff.; STEPHEiN, DIGEST OF CRIMINAL
LAW (7th ed. 1926) art. 385; 2 WHEARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 193o. The dif-
ferences are, however, chiefly matters of detail.3 
NE wEL., SLANDER AND LiDEr. (4th ed. 1924) 219. See also' Roberts v. English Mfg.
Co., 155 Ala. 414, 46 So. 752 (19o8) ; Hurtert v. Weines, 27 Iowa 134 (1869) ; Youmans v.
Smith, 153 N. Y. 214,47 N. E. 265 (i897). See KING, LAW OF CRIMINAL LIBEL- (1912) 229.
' NEWxz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 218; ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER (4th ed. 19o5) I5o;
STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 2, art. 388. In Prescott v. Tousey, 5o N. Y. Super. 12, 14 (1884),
the court said: "A libel is published when it is communicated to some person, other than the
plaintiff, who understands it, and not until then. . . . The plaintiff must show, by evidence,
that some one read the libel in some one of the papers that the defendant 'published'. In
other words, before she can recover she must show that the defendant did in fact, publish the
libel." Statutory provisions in accord with this are found in GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926)
§ 4430; IOwA CODE (1931) § 1326o, 13261; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 21, §§ 2404,
2405; ME. REV. STAT. (930) c. 141, § i; MO. REV. STAT. (1929) § 4368; N. M. STAT. ANN.
(Courtright, 1929) § 35-3509; N. D. ComP. LAWs ANN. (0913) § 9551; TENN. CODE (932)
§ 11023; TEx. REv. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 1277.
'In Staub v. Van Benthuysen, 36 La. Ann. 467, 469 (1884), the court said: "Publication
is the communication of the libel or defamatory matter to a third person. . . . Every sale
or delivery of a written or printed copy of a libel is a fresh publication. . . ." While this
was a civil case, the doctrine of publication is the same in civil and criminal libel, with the
exception that communication to the person libeled will support the criminal charge, but not
the civil action; NEWEL , op. cit. supra note 3, § 833.
'Mills v. State, i8 Neb. 575, 26 N. W. 354 (1886) ; Commonwealth v. Dorrance, 14
Phila. 671 (Pa. 1879) ; Rex v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95 (Eng. 1820) ; see Giles v. State, 6 Ga.
276 (1849). In Rex v. Burdett, Justice Best said (at 126) : "It is assumed that publication
means the manifestation of the contents. I deny that such is the meaning of the word . . .
in the case of a libel, publication is nothing more than doing the last act for the accomplish-
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Although this latter definition had the support of so distinguished a jurist
as Justice Best, the weight of authority and the better reasoning seem to sup-
port the former view, that there must be actual communication of the libel.
The criminal law punishes libel, not because of the injury to the reputation of
the person defamed, but because it is calculated to provoke a breach of the
peace.' But words which have never been communicated cannot provoke such
a breach, so it would seem essential that the words be communicated to make
them punishable.
Thus, it seems that the better definition of publication is that which re-
quires actual communication of the defamatory matter to others. Although the
courts generally adhere to this definition, there are occasions on which they
adopt different meanings of the word, usually, as will be seen subsequently from
a discussion of the specific cases, because the court feels that that would be
the easiest way to arrive at what it considers to be the justice of the case.
The determination of what constitutes a publication is fundamental in a
discussion of the venue of criminal libel because of the fact that, until there
is a publication, there is no crime for which there can be an indictment. Fur-
ther, it is the general rule that a crime is indictable in the jurisdiction in which
it becomes complete." This did not rise as a serious problem in the law of libel
until fairly recently, with the advent of newspapers having a statewide, and
in a few cases a national, circulation, of press bureaus sending news items to
a large proportion of the papers in the country," and of the radio, with its great
national chains. 10 This discussion will center chiefly about the newspaper
cases, since it is in them that the problem most clearly appears.
ment of the mischief intended by it. The moment a man delivers a libel from his hands his
control over it is gone; he has shot his arrow, and it does not depend upon him whether it
hits its mark or not. There is an end of the locus poenitentiae, his offense is complete, all
that depends upon him is consummated, and from that moment, upon every principle Of com-
mon sense, he is liable to be called upon to answer for his act."
It should be noted that all of these decisions deal with the venue of prosecutions for the
publication of libelous matter in letters, which can be published in only one of two places, the
jurisdiction where it was mailed or the jurisdiction where it was received and read. This
makes a much simpler problem than in the case of a newspaper with a wide circulation. Fur-
ther, none of the decisions go so far as to say that the jurisdiction iq which the libel is put
out of the writer's control is the ondy jurisdiction in which a prosecution may be instituted;
see 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 1957.
Modern statutes, however, go farther and say that the offense is complete when the
writer puts the libel out of his possession so that it will be communicated tci others; Agiz.
CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4619; IDAHO COMP. STAT. (1919) § 8257; MONT. REV. CODE
(Choate, 192i) § 10993; N. Y. PEN. LAW (19o9) § 1343; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1931)
8§ 1824, 2304; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) §§ 3607, 4086; UTAH ComN. LAws (1917) § 8o76.
7CLARK, op. cit. supra note I, at 463; NaEwLL, op. cit. supra note 3, at 913; STARKIE,
SLANDER AND LIBEL (6th ed. 1897) 167, 715 ff. See State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266, 269 (1828) ;
Kennerly v. Hennessy, 68 Fla. 138, i39, 66 So. 729 (1914) (habeas corpus) ; Commonwealth
v. Clap, supra note I, at 167.
'People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161 (1859) ; State v. Shaeffer, 89 Mo. 271, I S. W. 293 (1886);
State v. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512, 36 S. W. 39 (I896); cf. People v. Hodges, 27 Cal. 34o
(1865) (accessory) ; State v. Wyckoff, 31 N. J. L. 65 (1864) (accessory) ; People v. Mur-
ray, 95 N. Y. Supp. 107 (1905) (conspiracy). See I WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 310,
340-342; CLARK, op. cit. supra note I, §§ 165, 166; CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Am. L.
Inst. 1930) § 24o and pp. 694-696.
9 Very few actions, either criminal or civil, seem to have been instituted against any of
the larger news-gathering associations, but when one considers the number of papers sub-
scribing to their services and the possibilities of a factual misstatement such as the Associ-
ated Press seems to have made in Layne v. Tribune Co., U. S. Daily, Feb. 14, 1933, at 2162
(Fla. 1933), one realizes that the liability to prosecution would be almost unbounded.
' The radio is still too young to have produced much litigation, especially in the field of
libel and slander; the few decisions and statutes are discussed infra. There has however
been a great deal of discussion of the problem in all its aspects; see S. DAvis, LAW OF RADIO
COMM NICATION (1927) 157, 170 ff.; W. J. DAvis, RADIO LAW (2d ed. 1930) 97 ff.; Zou.-
MANN, LAW OF THE AIR (1927) 124-125; Vold, Defamation by Radio (1932) 2 J. RADIO L.
673.
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In the earlier cases, even where the indictment was against the editor of
a newspaper, it does not appear that an attempt was ever made to indict him
in more than one county, although the papers must have circulated in several.1 1
It later became apparent that, since the offense was not complete until there
was publication, an indictment might be returned in every jurisdiction in which
the defamatory words were communicated to others. And the defendant would
not be able to set up by way of defense a prior acquittal or conviction in another
jurisdiction, since that would be for a different crime.' 2
The courts felt that this was too great a punishment to impose upon the
publisher, especially since the owner of the newspaper was criminally liable, even
though he did not know what was being published and had no way of know-
ing. 3 So, in the absence of legislative action, the courts began stretching the
interpretation of already existing statutes. The subject may be divided into
three very distinct phases: (I) At common law; (II) Under constitutional and
statutory provisions as to venue in general; (III) Under provisions fixing venue
in prosecutions for libel.
I. At Common Law
At common law a libel printed in a newspaper or other periodical was in-
dictable in any place where the paper containing it had been circulated. None of
the English cases seem to have involved newspapers, the question having been
the place of publication of libelous letters, whether at the place where they were
mailed or where they were received.14 The case most analogous to the news-
paper cases was Rex v. Johnson,5 in which the defendant wrote libelous letters
in Ireland and mailed them to a publisher in England, where they were printed
and circulated. It was held that an indictment lay in the English county where
the letters were circulated and read, the court saying:
". . . one who procures another to publish a libel is, no doubt, guilty of
the publication, in whatever county it is in fact published in consequence
of his procurement". 16
The earliest American case, Commonwealth v. Blanding' decided in 1825,
involved a libel appearing in a newspaper printed in Rhode Island, but which
was circulated and read in a county in Massachusetts. It was held that such
circulation was competent and conclusive evidence of a publication within Mas-
sachusetts.
The theory underlying this decision and those which have followed it 18
is that the crime was not complete until the libel was published, and that the
'State v. Moore, 14o La. 281, 72 So. 965 (1916) seems to be the only reported case in
which conviction on more than one indictment was sought.
See United States v. Smith, 173 Fed. 227, 231 (D. Ind. i9og) ; State v. Moore, supra
note II, at 311, 72 So. at 975. But see the reasoning of Eberhardt v. Barker, 140 So. 633, 634
(.Fla. 1932) (writ of prohibition).
'Commonwealth v. Morgan, 1O7 Mass. 199 (1871); Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 7 S.
& R. 469 (Pa. 1822) ; Commonwealth v. Willard, 9 W. N. 524 (Pa. 1881); Rex v. Walter,
3 Esp. 21 (Eng. 1799) (newspaper proprietor convicted although he was residing in the
country and had no part in the management, his son managing the paper); Rex v. Gutch,
Moody & M. 433 (Eng. 1829) ; see (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 779.
"Rex v. Girdwood, I Leach C. C. I69 (Eng. 1776) ; Rex v. Watson, i Camp. 215 (Eng.
i8o8) ; Rex v. Williams, 2 Camp. 5o6 (Eng. 181o).
'7 East 65 (Eng. I8O5). A similar case arising in this country in State v. Kountz, 12
Mo. App. 5i1 (1882) was decided on slightly different principles, but with the same result.
' Rex v. Johnson, supra note I5, at 68.
' 3 Pick. 304 (Mass. 1825); cf. State v. Kountz, supra note 15.
'Baker v. State, 97 Ga. 452, 25 S. E. 341 (895) ; State v. Kountz, supra note 15; see
Haskell v. Bailey, 63 Fed. 873 (C. C. A. 4th, 1894) ; Leavy v. State, 45 Ga. App. 574, 165 S.
E. 47o (1932); Belo & Co. v. Wren, 63 Tex. 686 (1884); cf. It re Buell, 3 Dill. II6 (U. S.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
indictment was therefore properly brought in the jurisdiction in which it was
so completed. As was pointed out in In re Dana,'
"The law of libel, however, authorizes an indictment where the libel-
ous matter has been circulated through the defendant's instrumentality or
procurement, and the common-law authorities justify the contention .
that if the accused, within one jurisdiction has set agencies in motion for
the purpose of procuring the circulation of the libelous matter in another
jurisdiction, the offense was committed by him in the latter jurisdiction,
though he was not physically present there."
The possibilities inherent in such a situation can readily be seen. Prosecu-
tions could be instituted in every county in which there was a newspaper sub-
scriber, and they could also be instituted not only against the reporter but also
against the owner of the newspaper. The courts sensed this, and, feeling that
it imposed a possibility of limitless prosecution and onerous punishment, em-
barked upon a career of statutory construction, seeking to limit the libeler's lia-
bility through the interpretation of existing statutes.
II. Under Constitutional and Statutory Provisions as to Venue in General.
The leading American case seeking to limit the jurisdictions in which such
a prosecution may be instituted is United States v. Smith.20  The defendant
printed a newspaper in Indiana, some copies of which were mailed to subscribers
in the District of Columbia. The court refused to order the defendant's removal
to the District of Columbia for trial, resting its opinion very largely on the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a person accused of any crime a trial in
the state or district in which the crime was committed. This, however, presup-
poses a large part of the answer, because if the publication does not take place
until the defamation is communicated to the Washington subscribers, the crime
was committed there, and the accused would be deprived of no constitutional
guarantee by being sent there for trial.
The court seemed to sense quite vividly the fact that the defendant could
have been indicted in a large number of jurisdictions for the utterance of those
words,2 and, in spite of the contention of counsel for the government, realized
that a prior conviction or acquittal would not have been a defense in such a
case. It was finally forced to the conclusion that the act of depositing the papers
in the postoffice at Indianapolis was the only publication.
22
Part of the court's difficulty in this case seems to arise from a confusion
of the two meanings of "publication". In its legal sense, as was noted in the
earlier discussion of the meaning of the word, "publication" means the commu-
nication of the defamatory matter to third persons, while it is popularly used
C. C. 8th, 1875). In In re Storey (1876) 3 CrET. L. J. 636, the governor of Illinois, in de-
clining to surrender for extradition the editor of an Illinois paper who had been indicted for
libel in Wisconsin, did not question that the editor was answerable to the courts of a juris-
diction where his newspaper circulated, but held that, under the Constitution, extradition pre-
supposes a presence in, and a fleeing from, the demanding jurisdiction. In a frequently quoted
charge to a grand jury, appearing in (1878) I N. J. L. J. 24, Depue, J., said: "To be in-
dictable in this county the publication of the libel must be made in the county. But the pub-
lication having been made in the county for which the Grand Jury sits, every one connected
with the publication is liable to indictment. The composition of a libel by one in another
county or another State, who sends it by mail into the county where the publication is made,
is indictable there for the illegal act of publication, as well as those by whose instrumentality
the publication is made."
'°68 Fed. 886, 888 (S. D. N. Y. 1895).
e Supra note 12; cf. In re Buell, supra note 18; In re Dana, supra note 19.
nId., at 231, 232; see State v. Moore, supra note II, at 311, 72 So. at 975.
Id., at 232: "I am speaking of the facts as shown by the evidence here-where people
print a newspaper here, and deposit it in the post-office here, for circulation throughout other
states, territories, counties, and districts, there is one publication, and that is here."
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as almost synonymous with "printing". 23 This same confusion appears in other
cases so often, in fact, that one is inclined to believe that it is not the result
of a failure of perception or of carelessness, but of a deliberate attempt to secure
what is conceived to be a desirable result. The fact remains, however, that
while this newspaper was printed in Indiana, it was published in Washington
and in every other jurisdiction where its contents were communicated to others.
In 1916, the Louisiana court2 4 found itself faced with a similar situation,
but, and in this the case is almost unique, prosecutions had actually been com-
menced in several other "parishes". In a very exhaustive opinion, in which all
of the possibilities were explored, the court invoked the constitutional provision
that "all trials shall take place in the parish in which the offense was com-
mitted", 2 and held that this offense was committed in New Orleans, where the
paper was printed. The court stated that any other conclusion
"would lead to the anomalous proposition that as many different offenses
were committed in as many different jurisdictions, by what [defendant]
did in the city of New Orleans, as there were copies of the newspaper con-
taining the alleged libelous article; that what [defendant] did in the city
of New Orleans was multiplied into as many thousands of offenses on his





What the court evidently intended as a reductio ad absurdum is a correct
statement of the law. All that the defendant did in New Orleans was to print
newspapers containing libelous matter. That in itself is not criminally punish-
able, because the essential element of criminal libel is missing-the mere act of
printing does not threaten any breach of the public peace. Such breach of the
peace, however, was threatened in each of the jurisdictions in which that matter
was communicated to third persons, and it was there that the crime was com-
mitted.
Both of these decisions had referred to the possibility of invoking the doc-
trine of "double jeopardy", but in neither of them was the judgment rested upon
that argument. In 1932, however, the Florida court granted a writ of prohibi-
tion in a prosecution for libel on that ground. 7 This argument overlooks the
true nature of the problem presented to the court, because the accused in such
case is not being twice put in jeopardy for the same criminal act, but for sepa-
rate and distinct crimes, each completed by the publication of the defamatory
matter in a different jurisdiction. It is true that there is only one libelous com-
position, but two or more criminal acts have been done in publishing that libel
in different counties.
None of the jurisdictional provisions common to the constitutions and stat-
utes of most of our states are of any aid to the courts in their struggle to limit
the scope of liability for criminal libel,28 except when subjected to rather tortuous
'In State v. Bass, 97 Me. 484, 489, 54 Atl. 1113, 1115 (1903), the court said: "The pub-
lication of a slander or libel, or of a will, means something quite different from the publica-
tion of a newspaper." Cf. State v. Berry, 112 Me. 5Ol, 92 Atl. 61g (1914) ; State v. Piver,
74 Wash. 96, 132 Pac. 858 (1913).
State v. Moore, supra note II.
LA. CoNST., art. I, § 9.
State v. Moore, supra note ii, at 313, 72 So. at 975.
Eberhardt v. Barker, supra note 12.
State v. Huston, i S. D. 644, 104 N. W. 45, (195) held that a conviction could be
had in every county where the paper was published, under a statute providing that where a
public offense was committed partly in one county and partly in another, the jurisdiction of
the offense is in either of such counties. As to similar statutes, see CODE OF CRIMINAL PRO-
cngua, supra note 8, §§ 240, 242, 244, 249. See also State v. Berry, supra note 23, showing the
tendency on the part of some courts to split up libel into several different offenses, under
statutory definitions.
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construction. The next remedy came from the legislatures, which soon began
to join in the attempt to protect the libeler from a multiplicity of prosecutions.
III. Under Provisions Fixing Venue in Prosecutions for Libel
Various state legislatures and constitutional conventions have sought to
solve this problem by the passage of acts fixing the venue of prosecutions for
criminal libel. In California the constitution provides 29 that:
"Indictments found or information laid, for publications in newspa-
pers, shall be tried in the county where such newspapers have their publi-
cation office, or in the county where the party alleged to be libeled resided
at the time of the alleged publication . . .
This represents one of the two general forms which such statutes take.
The other form is that used in Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada and Washington:
"Every indictment for a libel contained in a newspaper published in
the state may be found in any county where the paper was published or
circulated, but a person shall not be indicted or tried for the publication
of the same libel against the same person in more than one county".
30
This is merely a codification of the common-law rule with the added provision
limiting one's liability to a single indictment.
These statutes would seem to give evidence of the same confusion in the
minds of the legislators as to the meaning of the word "publication" as we
have seen in the minds of the courts. In the statute quoted above, for instance,
provision is made for indictment "in any county where the paper was published
or circulated". Is "published" used here in the same sense as "printed", or
was it intended that the words "published" and "circulated" should be iterative?
To publish a libel is much the same as to circulate it, except that publication
implies the additional element that the libel be read, which is not a necessary
element of the "circulation" of the paper in which it is contained.
In State v. Piver,31 the Washington court had under consideration a stat-
ute providing 3 2 that
".. . the editor or proprietor of a book, newspaper or serial shall be pro-
ceeded against in the county where such book, newspaper or serial is pub-
lished", and "Every other person publishing a libel in this state may be
proceeded against in any county where such libelous matter was published
or circulated .
The defendant was the editor of a newspaper printed in California but circu-
lated and read in Washington. The court held that the first provision of the
statute had reference only to matter printed within the state, and that defendant
was properly indicted under the second provision, the indictment having been
found in a county where the paper was so circulated. The verb "to publish"
is used three times in these two provisions, and, in the light of the court's inter-
pretation, which seems to be the only one possible, it is used in two different
senses: in the first provision it is used as a synonym of "print", while it is used
'CAI.. CONsT., art. I, § 9; In re Kosalsky, 73 Cal. 120, 14 Pac. 399 (1887). See a simi-
lar statute in N. Y. PEN. CoDE (1909) §§ 1346-1348; United States v. Press Publishing Co.,
219 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct. 212 (1911); People v. Bihler, 154 App. Div. 618, 139 N. Y. Supp.
819 (1913). There was once a similar statute in Kentucky, Shields v. Commonwealth, 55 S.
W. 881 (Ky. I9OO), but it has now been repealed.
'
0MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 1O114; see IND. ANN. STAT. (Bums, 1926) § 2o44;
Nav. Comp. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 10113; WASr. Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 2429.
' Supra note 23.
SWAsH. Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §§ 2428, 2429.
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twice in the second section as a synonym of "communicate". 8 This confusion
on the part of the legislators is more comprehensible than that on the part of
the courts, because the legal background of the law, particularly in its more
specialized fields, such as criminal libel, is unknown to many of the members
of our state legislatures. But it is regrettable that poor draftsmanship and a
failure to understand that publication means the communication of defamatory
matter to others should vitiate many of the beneficial effects intended to flow
from these statutes.
Conclusion
In summarizing the discussion thus far it is found that at common law
criminal libel was indictable in any, and every, jurisdiction in which the defam-
atory matter was communicated to others. There was thus the possibility of
a multiplicity of prosecutions as a result of the printing of the same libel, and,
under a few modern statutory provisions, it is still possible. But a number of
legislatures passed acts either providing that a man could be punished only once
for the publication of the same libel, or limiting the jurisdictions in which pros-
ecutions could be instituted. In states where the legislatures did not so act, the
courts have, by various interpretations of existing statutory and constitutional
provisions regarding venue in general, attempted to limit the venue of criminal
actions in the same manner. It has been seen that most of these interpretations
are quite untenable. 4
On examination of the cases, it is apparent that although there has been
an immense increase in the possibility of criminal prosecutions for a libel over
the period when such cases were limited to those arising from the publication
of a libelous letter, there has not been a corresponding increase in the proba-
bility of breaches of the peace. Only one prosecution could be instituted for
the publication of a libelous letter, i. e., in the jurisdiction where it was re-
ceived and read, which would be the logical place for a breach of the peace
resulting therefrom to occur. There could be on the other hand, countless
prosecutions for a libelous statement in a newspaper, one in each jurisdiction
where the newspaper was read, although it is highly improbable that there
would be a breach of the peace in each of them.
Another factor worthy of note is that multiple punishments for the dissemi-
nation of the same libelous statement seem rather unfair and unjust. To mod-
ern eyes libel is not as serious an offense as it formerly was, when there was
greater probability of resort to force by the injured party and his friends. It
would seem that the honor of the person defamed having been sufficiently vin-
dicated by the first conviction of the libeler, subsequent indictments should be
frowned upon as unjust persecution.
The courts, in newspaper cases, are influenced by the ideal of freedom of
the press within decent limits. To secure any measure of freedom of comment
by the newspapers, it is necessary that the burden imposed upon them for making
statements which may later turn out to be libelous be not too severe. All that
is necessary is a sufficient penalty to prevent the "freedom" from degenerating
to "license". This penalty is as satisfactorily supplied by a single criminal
' The same confusion appears in N. Y. Pzi. CoDE, especially in contrasting the language
of § 1346 with § 1347.
' Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation (1903) 3 CoT. L. REv. 546:
"Unfortunately the English law of defamation is not the deliberate growth of any period. It
is a mass which has grown by aggregation, with very little intervention from legislation, and
special and peculiar circumstances have from time to time shaped its varying course. The
result is that perhaps no other branch of the law is as open to criticism for its doubts and diffi-
culties, its meaningless and grotesque anomalies. It is, as a whole, absurd in theory, and
very often mischievous in its practical operation."
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prosecution, coupled with a civil action for damages by the injured party, as
by a multitude of criminal actions.
In view of these considerations, the desirable end seems to be to limit to
a single action the defamer's liability to criminal prosecution. It has been the
purpose of this note to show that, although courts and legislatures have taken
steps in this direction, they have not been wholly successful in attaining their
goal: the courts because of the difficulty experienced in evading the contrary
provisions of the common law, the legislatures because not sufficiently versed
in the subject about which they are legislating. Yet it must be obvious that the
only solution which can be legally consistent lies in the legislatures, and it is for
them to enact laws which will restrict the venue of prosecutions for criminal
libel.3 5
K.M.B.
'To date only four states have adopted statutes making defamation over the radio a
criminal offense. CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) §§ 258, 784 (a) ; IL. R v. STAT. (Cahill,
1931) c. 38, § 567 (I) ; N. D. Laws, 1929, c. 117; Ore. Laws, 1931, c. 366. One other state
has held it to be libel where a radio speaker reads from a prepared manuscript. Sorenson v.
Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932); see (I932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 228; Note
(1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 133; Note (1933) 4 Am L. REv. 8o; Void, siapra note io. Only one
case has arisen regarding the venue o~f an action under these statutes, an unreported lower
court decision in Illinois, in which it was held that the prosecution could properly be brought
in the county where the libelous words were heard, although the speaker and thd broadcast-
ing station were in a different county. People v. Broucek, described in (193o) I Am L. REv.
344. This seems to be the first step in a duplication of the history of newspaper libel, and
the problem of venue in cases of radio defamation will become more important with the
passage of more statutes; the legislatures should also make similar provisions for them.
